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Consider claims of the forms  
F is a social construct  
and 
  F is socially constructed. 
 ‘F’ here can be replaced by ‘heterosexuality’, ‘whiteness’, ‘bachelorhood’, ‘soup’, 
‘planethood’, or any other general term, simple or complex (including general terms 
formed by abstraction). The instances of these schemata are furthermore, when taken at 
face value, about the properties expressed by the general terms in question. Let us call the 
instances social construction claims. It is unclear just what the people who make social 
construction claims mean (literally) by them. However, the purpose of this paper will not 
be to figure that out -- that would be a very difficult sociological/lexicographical task that 
philosophers are not well placed to carry out. Rather, I will ask this question: what, if any, 
are the interesting and more or less clear truths in the vicinity of those social construction 
claims that we feel compelled to accept? What truths should we ‘rationally reconstruct’ 
ourselves as expressing when we make these claims? According to the reconstruction I 
propose, they are not claims about (only) the properties they appear to be about on the 
surface -- bachelorhood, planethood, etc. -- but rather about the relationship between the 
general terms that appear in them (or perhaps the corresponding ‘concepts’, whatever that 
amounts to) and the properties they express, which are their meanings. The basic idea is 
that we should reconstruct ‘F is socially constructed’ as expressing the claim that the 
relationship between ‘F’ and F is socially constructed in a certain sense. Thus, for 
example, we should reconstruct ‘‘Heterosexuality’ is socially constructed’ as expressing 
the claim that the relationship between ‘heterosexuality’ and heterosexuality (the property 
of being heterosexual) is socially constructed in that sense. The reconstruction, then, treats 
social construction claims as cases of mixed quotation similar to Quine’s (1943: 113) 
famous example  
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(1) Giorgione was so-called because of his size, 
 
which is more perspicuously paraphrased -- or ‘rationally reconstructed’ – as 
 
  (2) Giorgione was called “Giorgione” because of his size. 
 
Similarly, I propose to paraphrase 
 




(4) The relationship between ‘heterosexuality’ and heterosexuality is socially    
construction. 
 
In turn, the sense in which the relationship between a general term (predicate) and 
the property that is its meaning is socially constructed when a social construction claim is 
true is this: the predicate could have easily had a different property as its meaning had our 
social practices involving the use of the predicate been slightly different. In slogan(ish) 
form: a meaning relationship is socially constructed when and only when it is highly 
unstable under counterfactual variation in social practices1.  
 
1 Here, it is important to distinguish between counterfactual instability and variation in meaning over time or 
between speakers or communities of speakers. So, if ‘F s socially constructed’ is true at time t1 then ‘F’ 
could have easily had a different meaning at time t1. What accounts for ‘F’ easily having a different meaning 
at time t1 could be that at some other time in the past t0, ‘F’ could have easily been introduced as a reference 
to a different paradigm object for example. Note that this is consistent with the ‘F’ never being in fact 
associated with any other meaning with all speakers in all communities who use ‘F’ associating ‘F’. This will 
become more apparent in the examples in §6.  
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2. PRELIMINARIES  
The focus of my thesis will be on social construction claims of one particular grammatical 
form. The claims that I speak of and reconstruct are social construction claims involving 
general terms (predicates). Thus I am setting aside singular social construction claims and 
their generalizations: for example, ‘The United States Of America is socially constructed’ 
and ‘(All) states are socially constructed’ are not among the kinds of claims I am interested 
in, while ‘Statehood is socially constructed’ is among the claims I am interested in. All of 
the claims of interest are ones that are, when taken at face value, about properties. That 
class of claims cannot be characterized by their superficial grammatical form alone: 
consider ‘Marriage is socially constructed’. This could be taken as meaning that the 
institution of marriage — in contrast with the two-place relation of marriage — is socially 
constructed, and on that reading it is not among my target claims. 
In the next section, we are going to familiarize ourselves with other contemporary 
accounts of social construction and understand how mine is different from them. Earlier I 
stated that the truth is about the relationship or association between the predicate ‘F’ and 
the property of being an F. So, to make my claim more intelligible my next step will 
provide some clarificatory facts about what I have in mind when I say ‘property’. After 
this, we will look at an intuitive response to the question of what we might mean when we 
make social construction claims. The response is somewhat wrong but it does get 
something right. I take what it gets right and revise it to come up with reconstructed truth 
conditions for social construction claims. The idea of the reconstruction is that the 
relationship between a predicate and the property it expresses is socially constructed: ‘F is 
socially constructed’ is reconstructed as the claim that the association between ‘F’ (the 
predicate) and the property F is socially constructed in the sense of being highly sensitive 
to counterfactual variation in our social practises involving our use of the predicate ‘F’. 







3. THE STATE OF THE ART 
 
In this section I will survey the state of the art on the topic of social construction and 
explain how my project relates to it. My project, it will turn out, is somewhat orthogonal to 
the questions asked in the literature and more continuous with the metaphysics of 
naturalness in the Lewisian tradition (Lewis 1983) currently represented by Theodore 
Sider, Cian Dorr, and Andrew Bacon among others, to which I turn at the end of this 
section. While that literature is ostensibly about what is not socially constructed, an 
account of what is not socially constructed draws the same distinction as an account of 
what is socially constructed. I will begin with a review of the literature on social 
construction, focusing mainly on Ian Hacking and Sally Haslanger’s works on social 
construction which I take to be representative of it. I will survey how that literature 
conceives social construction in various senses of the term, while making explicit how my 
reconstruction of social construction claims is different from those ways of thinking and 
what it adds to the conversation.  
Ian Hacking in his 1999 book The Social Construction of What?, proposes that the 
right way to answer questions about social construction is not to form a consensus on the 
definition of social construction or to answer the question ‘What is it to be socially 
constructed?’; rather the weight of this subject should be on its relevance. He urges us to 
ask, ‘What’s the point?’ (Hacking 1999: 5). The offshoot of asking this question then is 
that a considerable amount of social construction talk revolves around the details of the 
causes and consequences of it. These details are what make social construction relevant for 
Hacking. Like most of the contemporary social constructionists’, his work too is highly 
immersed in the implications of the ‘social construction’ label. In fact, the only cases of 
social construction that he finds that social constructionists think are worth debating about 
and exploring are those (whose implications/ that) need to be reformed.  
Hacking is more focused on ‘local claims’ by which he means social construction of 
particular Xs 2. The details of the social construction of a particular X is discussed with the 
 
2 Note that Hacking is using ‘X’ as a schematic letter (apparently) with the rule that ‘X’ may only be replaced 
by an expression ‘F’ if ‘F is socially constructed’ is true. In any case, he is interested in only discussing 
socially constructed Xs and exploring the causes and consequences of X being socially constructed. On the 
other hand, the ‘F’ in my reconstruction of the claims of the form ‘F is socially constructed’ may or may not 
7 
 
aim to raise consciousness about that X. This approach to social construction makes it so 
that the contents of discussion of the various socially constructed X s are distinct from one 
another. In this case he claims that one might be a social constructionist about some Xs but 
not about other Xs. He is in the business of discussing each X (for example - widowhood, 
reality, danger, etc.) separately with the aim to “raise consciousness” about each of them. 
This aim, according to Hacking, is what drives constructionists to make some socially 
constructed X their subject. (Hacking 1999: 6).  
The following is how Hacking characterizes what most philosophers working on 
social construction believe about it - 
Social construction work is critical of the status quo. Social constructionists about X tend to hold that:  
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined 
by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.  
Very often they go further, and urge that:  
(2) X is quite bad as it is.  
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed (Hacking 
1999: 6). 
In (1), the contingency of X is highlighted. It could have been the case that X never came 
into existence because socio historical events and/or factors shaped things in a way that 
skipped creating X. Additionally, X could have existed but not in the same way as it does at 
present. Now, (2) and (3) are not something that must be true of socially constructed X. 
Hacking claims that by and large social constructionists tend to participate in discussions 
over the kind of X that they would like to “criticize, change, or destroy”.  
A paradigm case – gender. Following the De Beauvoir slogan ‘One is not born one, 
but rather becomes, a woman’, it then became obvious to most feminist scholars that 
gender is constructed. Due to inevitable distinctions between sexes, the term ‘gender’ was 
introduced.  
Let X = gender in (1)–(3) above. Feminists convinced us (1) that gendered attributes and relations are 
highly contingent. They also urged (2) that they are terrible, and (3) that women in particular, and 
human beings in general, would be much better off if present gender attributes and relations were 
abolished or radically transformed. (Hacking 1999: 7).  
Now, inserting gender in this framework is not a difficult task. The main thesis of the early 
feminists was that biology i.e. sexes do not have definite associated genders. Some 
 
be socially constructed. I’m interested in whether F is socially constructed or not and what makes it so that it 
is or isn’t socially constructed. 
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feminists also tend to think that ‘gender is socially constructed’ also implies that it is 
constructed in a way to display an apparent – inferiority of women and inherent nature of 
male dominance. Judith Butler takes a step forward and claims that we are gendered 
according to how we ‘perform’. Her view is also rather extreme in that she insists that the 
way we live our lives determines what kind of body we have because it is a part of our 
lives. Somewhere down the line, it could also have the consequence that ‘the distinction 
between sex and gender is no distinction at all’. Then there is Monique Wittig who 
believes that ‘[t]he entire set of sexual and gender categories should be overthrown. 
(According to Wittig) the lesbian is an agent of revolution because she lives out a refusal to 
be either man or woman.’ (Hacking 1999: 19) 
 According to Hacking there should be no place for obvious social construction 
claims. This means, if everyone is aware that X is a contingent result of sociohistorical 
events and factors, then any constructionist project about it is futile3. We must discuss the 
social construction of an X if it meets the following precondition –  
(0)      In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable. (Hacking 1999: 
12) 
He gives us the example of a woman refugee. It seems inevitable if all the social elements 
like citizenship, immigration and women fleeing their nations are desperately asking for 
help from other counties. Constructionists believe that this concept, the social setting, 
related practices and even the material infrastructure is in fact not inevitable. (Hacking 
1999: 12).  
Revisiting the idea of a ‘worthwhile social construction project’ – Hacking is not 
denying that obvious claims about X means that X is not constructed. He is merely stating 
that it’s not a worthwhile project. For example, ‘Inventing Japan’ does not pass this test 
because everyone knows that modern day Japan is a consequence of a variety of social and 
 
3 Hacking’s talk of social construction has the aim of “raising consciousness” about the Xs and so he thinks a 
project about Xs that are obviously socially constructed is not worthwhile. My view does not take it so that a 




historical events and since those events are not inevitable, nor is modern day Japan 
(Hacking 1999: 12) 
 There are 2 types of things that can be constructed according to Hacking – ideas 
and objects. Let’s talk about the former i.e. the ‘idea-constructionist’ project. There’s 
nothing very exciting about the claim that the idea or concept of X is socially constructed. 
Obviously ideas that we have of anything follow from socio-historical events. But he 
identifies 3 ‘sticking points’ that makes this part of his account worthwhile and 
philosophically interesting. The preferred example here is taken from natural sciences – a 
social constructionist view would take it that there could have been a different equally 
successful science that led us to something else and not quarks. Previous milestones in 
physics or the world itself do not determine exactly the next one. This is the first ‘sticking 
point’ – contingency (Hacking 1999: 32-33). 
 Another constructionist view is that how we classify things is not dependent on 
how the world really is. We choose these ways of thinking and sorting based on the route 
we happen to take and to make things convenient. An adversary of this view would say that 
the things we call ‘facts’ are the result of the inherent structure of the world and our 
discovery. The second ‘sticking point’ – nominalism. Scientists believe that discoveries 
like Maxwell’s Equations, the velocity of light, etc. are backed with compelling evidence 
that makes them highly stable. On the other hand, constructionists believe that the stability 
is owed to ‘factors external to the overt content of the science’. The third ‘sticking point’ – 
stability. Most genuine disagreement Hacking says emerges from one of these points 
(Hacking 1999: 33). 
 Stepping away from natural sciences, the way in which the social construction of 
human affairs is spoken about is different. Unlike the subjects of the former, people (the 
subjects of human affairs) can be aware of the labels put on them or the classification they 
seem to fit in. With time, people either remain classified as the same thing or don’t. 
Sometimes this change depends upon themselves recognizing said classification and 
choosing to adapt to or pull away from it. The people who are classified and what they are 
classified as have the ability to interact. For example, I am classified as a student of 
philosophy – so the classification or kind  of student of philosophy and I interact in a 
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certain sense. The latter can also undergo changes because the former have a different set 
of beliefs about themselves. This is called the looping effect of human kinds (Hacking 
1995). Here we’re starting to talk about objects (people). Sally Haslanger for one, is of the 
view that Hacking’s account of object-constructionism has more to offer to metaphysicians 
than his account of idea-constructionism (Haslanger 2003: 309).  
 For the aforementioned ‘looping effect’ to occur, the interaction of the 
classification and the associated classified is required. The group of objects that can 
interact with their classification are given the name interactive kinds by Hacking (1999: 
103). Interactive kinds are usually people that are of a certain kind. For example, children 
with ADHD or women refugees. ‘Here I am concerned with kinds of people, their 
behaviour, and their experiences involving action, awareness, agency, and self-awareness. 
The awareness may be personal, but more commonly is an awareness shared and 
developed within a group of people, embedded in practices and institutions to which they 
are assigned in virtue of the way in which they are classified.’ (Hacking 1999: 104). In 
contrast to this kind are the kind of objects that don’t interact, they are indifferent to what 
they are called or how they are classified4. For example, quarks don’t behave differently 
because they are called quarks. Of course, human interference through knowledge gained 
about them affects their behaviour but not in the way that is about the quarks awareness.  
 Now we know that when it comes to interactive kinds our schemes of 
classification don’t merely paint a clearer picture of pre-existing groups or kinds of people, 
they are also dynamic in the sense that obviously Hacking, but also Sally Haslanger 
explains. Certain classifications are the way they are because of a ‘feedback loop’ that 
occurs when those who are classified and their classification interact. Haslanger calls this 
discursive construction.  
‘Discursive construction: if something is discursively constructed, it is the way it is to some 
substantial extent, because of what is attributed (and/or self-attributed) to it.’ (Haslanger 1995: 99) 
Here, Haslanger is not only interested in the looping effect but also the way in which 
people who are not in question treat those who are classified as X. For example, (without 
 
4 See Bird, Alexander and Emma Tobin (2018) 
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paying heed to how socially constructed ‘coolness’ is) in addition to me modifying my 
behaviour because I am seen as uncool because I want to be classified as the contradiction 
of that – ‘cool’, I also might change my behaviour towards those who are not classified as 
‘cool’ or ‘uncool’ based on this entirely un-objective classification. I say un-objective 
because there is nothing inherently cool or uncool about anyone. These are only made up 
by various in-group patterns of behaviour and relations amongst people that are governed 
by social and historical events. So, these social factors are the cause of these 
classifications. This is another sense in which ‘coolness’ (or lack there-of) is socially 
constructed.  
‘Causal construction: Something is causally constructed iff social factors play a causal role in bringing 
it into existence or, to some substantial extent in its being the way it is.’ (Haslanger 1995: 98)  
Discursive construction is a kind of causal construction. I am socially constructed in the 
sense that I am the way I am (in some substantial manner) because of how I am classified 
as either “man” or ‘woman’, ‘pretty’ or ‘ugly’, ‘smart’ or ‘intelligent’ and the list could go 
on. But these distinctions are not dependent on what I am intrinsically, they are determined 
by social factors. Another way of looking at this is that not I, as a responder to these 
classificatory schemes, but all these classifications themselves are socially constructed. 
The determinacy of the use of these terms are based on social factors.  
 Classifications of human kinds like ‘woman’ and ‘man’, ‘smart’ and ‘stupid’, 
‘refugee’ and ‘resident’, etc. owe their existence to us humans sharing various relations 
with one another. More often than not, these relations result in hierarchy which dictates the 
status quo. These distinctions for example, cool and uncool are not the indication of the 
intrinsic nature of people put in those categories, but they are distinctions that portray 
certain social relations. For whatever social and historical reasons, it became so that I could 
either be cool or uncool at any given place or time but this has nothing to do with what my 
intrinsic nature is but something to do with how I am socially related to other people in the 
in-group under consideration. Social forces can be influential in how we draw these lines 
of distinction and therefore, classify. That brings us to the next kind of construction – 
pragmatic construction.  
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‘Pragmatic construction: A classificatory apparatus (be it a full-blown classification scheme or 
just a conceptual distinction or descriptive term) is socially constructed just in case its use is 
determined, at least in part, by social factors.’ (Haslanger, 1995: 100) 
There’s 2 types of pragmatically constructed distinctions – a distinction that’s use is only 
partially determined by social factors and so is weakly pragmatically constructed (for 
example – the distinction between man and woman); the other is a distinction that’s use is 
entirely determined by social factors and fails to represent accurately any ‘fact of the 
matter’ and so is strongly pragmatically constructed (for example- the distinction between 
cool and uncool) (ibid.). 
 Let’s take another look at the ‘coolness’ example. A ‘cool girl’ is discursively 
constructed because she is the classified object and she interacts with the classification of 
‘coolness’. The in-group knows that she’s cool, not just acting cool (because they 
acknowledge the difference). She’s cool because she behaves in a certain way and this 
behaviour is attributed to her intrinsic coolness as if the property of ‘coolness’ existed 
without any social kinds5 Haslanger wants to debunk the belief that ‘there is a special 
quality of coolness that warrants the designation of cool’. So she says that ‘coolness’ when 
defined needs to make reference to social factors and so it is constitutively constructed.  
‘Constitutively constructed: Something is constitutively constructed iff in defining it we make 
reference to social factors.’ (Haslanger 1995: 98) 
So discursive construction and constitutive construction are intertwined in this example. A 
person is classified as cool and so they are discursively constructed, but what they are 
classified as is constitutively constructed.  
 So far, we have seen 2 (or perhaps more) approaches to social construction talk. 
The pattern that is usually employed in this subject involves a deeper dive into the 
surrounding phenomena – the reasons for the “social matrix”6 being the way they are and 
how they affect X (given that X is socially constructed). Essentially, a branch of questions 
are being discussed and potentially answered. It goes beyond ‘what is social construction?’ 
or ‘what does it mean by X is socially constructed?’ to ‘what causes X?’, ‘Is X in need to be 
 
5 See Epstein, Brian (2018) "Social Ontology" for discussion on how social categories and kinds are set up. 
6 See Ch:1 of Hacking (1999) The Social Construction of What? 
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reformed?’, ‘what should we do in order to reform X’, “what are the social factors involved 
in creating X?’ and several more. Some (perhaps, most) philosophers are of the opinion 
that if those auxiliary questions are not discussed, then the spirit in which we address social 
construction claims is missing. Some are also of the belief that if we can’t satisfactorily 
answer the question ‘what’s the point?’ then we might as well, not bother ourselves with 
the project at all.  
 My intention in this thesis is to take a step back from the plethora of socially and 
politically driven arguments and definitions. The claim in this thesis is considerably divorced 
from the idea that the predicate F (or X) must produce a socio-politically relevant discussion 
in order for it to be worthy of being a social construction project. In what follows in this 
thesis, I will not be rejecting the aforementioned approaches towards social construction 
claims. Rather, I will be taking a different approach which is to describe a way of rationally 
reconstructing social construction claims that’s charitable in the way that what we take to be 
intuitively true comes out true using my reconstruction and what we take to be clearly 
intuitively false comes out false. It is a project not very different from that of Tarski’s in his 
paper “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” (1933) where he proposes a 
definition of the notion of a true sentence and gives certain criteria that an adequate definition 
of a notion of a true sentence must meet. ‘Socially constructed’ is used by academics in many 
different fields as well as journalists and a lot of people who don’t claim to be the authority 
on what is ‘socially constructed’ and what is not. This doesn’t seem so different from the 
case of ‘true’. Tarski was interested in a particular concept of truth that was implicit in how 
mathematicians used ‘true’. They invoke it, as he pointed out, for specific theoretical 
purposes. For example, they want to say that certain axioms are true, that certain rules 
preserve truth, and they want to be able to ask whether (say) all the truths of arithmetic are 
among the theorems of a certain formal theory. Tarski provided “a method of constructing 
definitions of truth classical for quantificational formal languages”7. When this method is 
successfully applied to a certain formal language, the result  will be that the sentences 
involving ‘true’ in the metalanguage that are intuitively true come out to be theorems, in 
particular sentences of the form “ ‘S’ is true iff ‘S’” where S is a sentence of the object 
 
7 Gómez-Torrente, Mario (2019: §2) 
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language. Similarly, I am attempting to provide a reconstruction of social construction claims 
that defines something we could mean when we make those claims while being intuitively 
satisfactory. The difference is he relied on his own intuitions about which sentences 
involving ‘true’ would be clearly true according to the mathematical use that he had 
identified. The concept of truth Tarski was reconstructing seems as ‘theoretical’ of a concept 
as anyone finds in academic literature that uses ‘socially constructed’. The cases aren’t 
different in that respect, although any pattern of use of ‘socially constructed’ on which we 

























4. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: HIGHER-ORDER METAPHYSICS 
  
To make the preceding sections and my thesis about social construction more intelligible, I 
will now clarify the sense in which I use the word ‘property’ in this thesis. To do this, we 
will theorize in the language of Higher-Order Logic (HOL) which is a framework for 
reasoning with expressions (like connectives, predicates, operators, etc.) that do not take 
the position of a singular term in the way we reason with singular terms in first-order logic 
(Bacon 2017: 5). When I talk about properties in this thesis, this is meant to be shorthand 
for quantification into the position of a predicate in a higher-order language. 
Let’s look at the following examples of FOL expressions: 
  
1.  ◻ Fa 
2    ∃x ◻Fx 
 
where x (a bound variable) takes the place of a singular term a. In HOL, we can also 
quantify into the position that the predicate (3) and the necessity operator (4) occupy in 1 
as follows: 
  
3.   ∃X ◻ Xa 
4.   ∃X (XFa) 
 
In this section, I will introduce higher-order logic as a theory of properties and more 
generally of relations, and I will justify its use as such a theory in the context of my thesis. 
This exposition will mostly follow Andrew Bacon’s works “The Broadest Necessity” 
(2018), A Philosophical Introduction of Higher-order Logic (Manuscript A) and Ch. 1 of 
Dorr, Hawthorne, and Yli-Vakkuri’s The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal 
Variation (forthcoming). 
In all formal languages used in philosophical, mathematical, and linguistic 
theorizing, expressions are categorized in types. It is a way of generalizing and 
systematizing relationships between expressions in logic (Bacon 2017: 5). The type of an 
expression tells us what types of expressions can this expression be applied to and what 
type of expression can be the result of it. For example, the predicate “is short'' would take 
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something with the type of a singular term like “Monica” and result in “Monica is short”. 
Similarly an expression can also take on the type of a sentence, a predicate, an operator, 
etc. The 2 most basic types in standard type theory are : e (the type of a singular term; it 
stands for entity) and t (the type of a well-formed formula; it stands for truth evaluable), 
and all of the types that can be constructed out of these by the → operation. So, e and t are 
types, and if a and b are types, so is (a → b) which represents an expression that takes in 
the type of a and results in an expression of type b.  
In the FOL example (2) above, we have only given a variable to an individual i.e. 
quantified into the position that an expression of type e occupies. In FOL, there are more 
than just expressions of type e and t. For example,  e → (e → t) (identity), t → t (negation),  
t → (t → t) (conjunction, disjunction, the material conditional, and the material 
biconditional). What makes it first-order is the fact that it only quantifies into the position 
of an expression of type e. HOL takes this one step forward by allowing quantification into 
the position of every type of expression and having variables of every type. In the above 
HOL example (3), a has type e and thus X has type e → t. To further this illustration, we 
can also have a sentence like the following: 
 
5.    ∃X(Fa ⋀ X(F))  (‘a is F and the property of being F has some property (of 
properties)’), 
  
where the variable X has type (e → t) → t. (5) is similar to the result of a formalization of 
an argument like: 
  
             c is an electron 
            The property of being an electron is natural 
            c has some natural property 
  
which we would formalize into: 
  
Ec  
            N(E)                 




where E and X have type e → t and N has type (e → t) → t. But, not everything that is 
‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’ is combined with a single argument to produce something else 
(Bacon, Manuscript A: 19). In the English language there are transitive verbs like ‘loves’ 
and ‘is married to’ that take in multiple arguments. For example: 
  
Loves: e → e → t. 
  
Both ‘loves’ and ‘is married to’ are relational and the relation (of being married to for 
example) can be ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. The argument would be the following: 
  
Sarah is married to John 
            Marriage is not natural 
            Sarah stands on some unnatural relation to John 
  
This argument, too, has a natural formalization in HOL, which is valid. It is the following: 
  
    Msj  
            ¬N′(M)                         
            ∃X(Xsj⋀ ¬N′(X)). 
  
Since M and X have type e → (e → t), here N′ has type e → (e→ t)) → t. This means that 
the predicate ‘is natural’ is not just of 1 type, but there are infinitely many ‘naturalness’ 
predicates of different types. ‘Natural’ is a property of a property of objects (or a property 
of a first-order predicate). This makes it a second-order predicate. Anything that is not a 
first order predicate is a higher order predicate. So, this property of type e → (e→ t)) → t is 
a multi-place relation. Properties of objects that have type e → t are 1-place relations. 0-
place relations have type t, which we call propositions or states of affairs. A relation is any 
entity of a type of the form 𝜎 → ... → t, and a predicate is any expression of a type of the 
form 𝜎 → ... → t. 
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  So, a social construction claim is any claim of the form ‘F is socially constructed’, 
where ‘F’ is a general term, i.e. a predicate. That is meant in the sense of HOL, which 
means that ‘F’ is any expression with a type of the form 𝜎 → ... → t. Below we will see 
some examples of social construction claims with ‘F’s of different types. We will see some 
examples of social construction claims with ‘F’s of different types later in this section.  
  Above, with the electron and marriage example, we saw how we formalize 
arguments about properties in HOL. The next step is to evaluate its validity and we can do 
this using tools from FOL. The electron and marriage example can be shown as valid by 
applying standard natural deduction rules to it (conjunction-intro followed by existential-
intro). So, we can apply any sound proof system from FOL to HOL because the latter 
includes the former and can generalize the rules of the former to any variable and constant. 
The construction of models to show that an argument in HOL is not valid is also a fairly 
straightforward generalization of the semantics of FOL to all types (see Bacon 2018: 
Appendix A.1).  
  
Here is an explanation of 3 reasons to adopt the higher-order approach to relations: 
1.  FOL, as we discussed earlier only allows for quantification into the position that an 
expression of type e occupies. So, if we quantify into the position of a property in FOL, we 
are treating expressions like ‘the property of being old and wise’ as expressions of type e 
and the ‘has’ in ‘Socrates has the property of being old and wise’ as two-place first-order 
predicate (type e→ (e→ t)).  This produces difficulties that make it almost necessary to 
reject a first-order approach here. The issue is that the adoption of a first-order approach 
will run into a property-theoretic version of Russell's paradox (Bacon, Manuscript A: Ch. 
5.2). To illustrate this let’s look at a (naïve) theory of properties that resembles Frege’s 
theory of extensions. Let px be a variable binding operation that combines with a formula 
φ(x) to form a singular term (type e) px.φ(x) meaning the property of being an x such that 
φ(x). Also, let’s postulate a binary relation instantiates which tells you an individual 
instantiates a property. So, Socrates instantiates the property of being old and wise. This 
must be subject to the law of naïve abstraction: a instantiates the property of being φ(x) if 
and only if φ(a). This can be formalized into: 
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I(a,pxφ) ↔ φ(a) 
Where I stands for the binary relation of instantiation. The reason we are compelled to 
reject this is that it is inconsistent. If φ is the formula ‘x doesn’t instantiate x’, and if a is 
the property of not instantiating yourself (i.e. px.φ). This yields a contradiction that the 
property applies to itself only if it doesn’t apply to itself. This can be formalized into: 
I(px.¬I(x,x),px.¬I(x,x)) ↔ ¬I(px.¬I(x,x),px.¬I(x,x)) 
We can’t reason about properties within the first-order approach without the inclusion of 
something like the naïve abstraction law. However, we can’t accept this due to the 
inconsistency aforementioned. Debates within the first-order approach tend to be 
exclusively devoted to devising a consistent theory of properties. The debate has not led to 
one wide consensus on a way to do away with this inconsistency or curb it. The result of 
this is that advocates of first-order theories of properties are not spending much their time 
applying their theories in metaphysics (Bacon, Manuscript A: 94). 
2. My approach to social construction cannot get off the ground without the higher-order 
approach The expression that replaces ‘F’ in ‘F is socially constructed’ may be any type of 
predicate. One can intelligibly raise questions like: 
  
Is heterosexuality socially constructed? (type e→ t) 
Is truth socially constructed? (type t → t) 
Is (numerical) identity socially constructed? (type e → (e→ t)) 
Is naturalness socially constructed? (type (e → t) → t)) 
  
My reconstruction of the social construction claim at issue in each of these questions will 
involve quantification into the type 𝜎 displayed in parentheses on the right of the question, 
and in particular it will require being able to rely on naive property abstraction. But we just 
saw that naïve property abstraction is inconsistent when formalized in a first-order 
language, so that is not an option. In higher-order logic we can take naïve property 




(λx.φ)a ↔ φ(a), 
 
which is valid in classical higher-order logic8. 
 
3. We can avoid getting bogged down in difficult problems in the semantics of natural 
languages by adopting the higher-order approach. I have been talking as if ‘the property of 
being old and wise’ were a complex predicate of type e → t, and thus as if ‘property’ were 
very different from an ordinary count noun like ‘table’ (which has type e → t). But this is 
very far from clear9 and from a higher-order point of view it can remain unclear without 
affecting the clarity of my thesis. I have simply adopted a convention of using certain 
English sentences as proxies for their natural formalizations in HOL, so that when I write, 
for example: 
  
(S1)      Socrates has a property, 
  
you know that I mean to be understood as if I had instead written: 
  
(S2)      ∃X(Xs), 
  
where s formalizes ‘Socrates’. It makes no difference whether (S1) and (S2) have the same 
meaning, nor whether (S1) even involves any higher-order quantification. All that matters 
is that you, the reader, know I mean to assert (S2). In using natural language sentences as 
proxies for certain HOL sentences and taking higher-order quantification as primitive, I am 
following the mainstream in contemporary higher-order metaphysics10. Here is a recent 
representative example: 
 
8 Classical higher-order logic was introduced by Church (1940). It generalizes the rules and axioms of first-
order logic to all types and adds to them the rules of the λ-calculus: Alpha, Beta, and Eta-Equivalence. The 
expressions (λx.φ)a and φ(a) are Beta-equivalent, so may by Beta-Equivalence be substituted for each other 
anywhere. (λx.φ)a ↔ φ(a) then follows from a theorem of classical logic (φ(a) ↔ φ(a)) by Beta-Equivalence. 
See Bacon Manuscript A: Ch. 3.3 
9 Bacon (Manuscript A: 94) seems to think that ‘is abstract’ in ‘Some property is abstract’ has type e → t. If 
this is so, ‘property’ also has type e → t, since ‘some’ has type (e → t) → ((e → t) → t). 
10 Bacon (Manuscript A: §5.5) and Dorr, Hawthorne, and Yli-Vakkuri (forthcoming: Ch. 1) explicitly adopt 
conventions according to which certain English sentences are ‘proxies’ for certain HOL sentences while 




While we will pronounce ∃X(◇X(Socrates)) as ‘There is a property that Socrates could 
instantiate’ when we are speaking loosely, we do not claim that it is equivalent to the 
ordinary English meaning of that sentence, and we certainly do not want to regard the 
formal sentence as being introduced by the stipulation that it is equivalent to that English 
sentence.  [...]  Rather, like Williamson, we think that the language of higher-order logic 
can be learnt by the “direct method” without taking a stand on how it relates to ordinary 
language.  And we think that it is a very good language for metaphysicians to know, 
since it can be used to raise many interesting and precise questions while avoiding a 
whole panoply of metaphysically uninteresting puzzles that ordinary loose talk of 
“properties” seems to present us with when taken at face value. In taking the higher-
order approach, we take no position on what such talk means when it is not treated as a 
shorthand for higher-orderese (Dorr, Hawthorne, and Yli-Vakkuri forthcoming: §1.2). 
  
It’s worth noting that in this last respect HOL is no different from FOL. Philosophers 
regularly use FOL for expressing generalizations about objects. For example, natural 
language seems to have no expression that works like the first-order quantifier ∃x. We 
formalize,  
  




(S4)     ∃x(Ox⋀Wx)  
  
and when we do so we do not worry about whether (S4) is true to the meaning or logical 
form of (S3). Like HOL, FOL is learned by immersion or the ‘direct method’ (Williamson 
2003: 459), and when we use FOL to express generalizations about objects, there is no 
need to take a position on whether those generalizations can be expressed in natural 
language. As long as the reader understands that (S3) is being used as a proxy for (S4), the 
actual meaning of (S3) is irrelevant.  
We are so used to using FOL in philosophical writing that it is easy for us to forget 
that there is no compositional mapping from English sentences to the FOL formulas that 
are used to thinking of their formalizations, nor back to English from those formalizations. 
For example, we cannot compositionally translate ‘something’ into ∃x and ‘is wise’ into W, 
since then we would have to translate ‘Something is wise’ into the ungrammatical string 
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∃xW. Nor can we compositionally translate ‘is wise’ into Wx: That would get ‘Something 
is wise’ right but it would get ‘Socrates is wise’ wrong (Wxs). We can see that syntactic 
ambiguity is the reason that there is no algorithm for translating from natural languages to 
FOL (or HOL). What we do in formal logic is introduce parentheses, type subscripts, etc. 
which disambiguates the syntax making it so that there can be an algorithm of translation 
from natural languages to FOL or HOL. This is what Montague gets at in his ‘English as a 
Formal Language’11 and other works on natural language. Possibly with a few exceptions, 
we could have a literal translation into HOL that are word for word or ‘direct 
compositionality’ (see Barker and Jacobson 2011). For example, the natural translation for 
‘has’ in the context ‘Socrates has some property’ is ‘λx. λY.Yx’ where x has type e and Y 
has type e → t. The natural translation for ‘and’ in the context ‘old and wise’ is ‘λX. λY. λz. 
(Xz & Yz)’ where z has type e and X and Y have type e → t. However, in FOL, it’s evident 
that the trio of expressions ‘something’, ‘is wise’, and ‘Socrates’ does not translate into 
anything in FOL and conversely, the trio ∃x, W and s does not translate into anything in 
English. This doesn’t stop us from effortlessly going back and forth between ‘Something is 
wise’ and ∃xWx and between ‘Socrates is wise’ and Ws. We take this as rudimentary while 
learning the basics of FOL. That they are easy to forget is a testament to the effectiveness 
of the ‘direct method’ in learning FOL. If the ‘direct method’ works for FOL, it should 
work for HOL. The other reason why HOL should be learned by the ‘direct method’ is that 
translations in the other directions, i.e. from HOL or FOL to natural languages, works 
differently. While there are compositional FOL to natural language translations there are 
arguably no compositional HOL to natural language translations. I agree with all 
philosophers like Williamson, Bacon, Dorr, Dorr-Hawthorne-Yli-Vakkuri, etc. who think 
this is no obstacle to learning the language. But, however that may be, we don’t use the 
parts of the language of HOL that can’t be compositionally translated into English when 






11 See Montague (1970a) 
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5. ARBITRARY BOUNDARIES 
 
The following is a natural way to respond to someone who asks, ‘What do you mean by the 
social construction claim?’ regarding soup (to take a particularly clear case). 
 
The classification of everything into things that are soups and the rest (things that 
are non-soups) depends on our social practices. So, governed by our social 
practices there is an arbitrary boundary created between soups and non-soups. I 
say ‘arbitrary’ because this boundary could have very easily been drawn slightly 
differently, and that would have made no practical difference. Take the example of 
gazpacho and the virgin mary (a non-alcoholic bloody mary). The former we call 
a soup, while the latter we do not, although they are both tomato-based, cold, 
savoury drinkable purées. This means that the classification has nothing to do 
with how these two things are intrinsically, but is entirely dependent on our social 
practices. The answer to the question “Why is gazpacho a soup and the virgin 
mary not?” is that, for some reason during the history of humans, we decided to 
draw the boundary there. It could have easily happened that we drew the 
boundary such that both gazpacho and the virgin mary were not soups or both of 
them were soups. Since our social practices decided where to draw this boundary, 
it is socially constructed. 
 
Let us call this the unreflective answer. One thing that the unreflective answer is getting 
wrong is that our social practices do not draw the boundary between soups and non-soups. 
What they draw is the boundary between the things that are in the extension of ‘soup’ and 
everything else -- by associating a particular property with ‘soup’. For that very reason, the 
unreflective answer is not entirely wrong: our social practices do draw an arbitrary 
boundary, namely the boundary between the extension of ‘soup’ and its anti-extension. 
This kind of arbitrariness is to be contrasted with metaphysical arbitrariness, which 
amounts to the boundary between the extension of a property (as opposed to a predicate) 
and its anti-extension being highly unnatural in the Lewisian sense. There may be 
interesting connections between the two varieties of arbitrariness, but they will not be 
explored in this thesis. 
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6. SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED BOUNDARIES 
 
The master argument 
 
Let’s talk about the logical form of a social construction claim. We established in section 4 
that the ‘F’ in ‘F is socially constructed’ may be a predicate of any type 𝜎. So, a simple 
step forward from that is the hypothesis that ‘is socially constructed’ is a predicate of type 
𝜎 → t. And if that is true then, being socially constructed is a property of relations – 
effectively those would be infinitely many properties, one of each type of the form 𝜎 → t 
where 𝜎 is the type of some relation. So, in the simplest form, where ‘F’ is a predicate of 
type (e → t.)  ‘is socially constructed’ is a predicate of type (e → t ) →t.  So, in the 
simplest case , where ‘F’ is a predicate of type (e → t)  ‘is socially constructed’ is a 
predicate of type (e → t ) → t. We will now explore an argument that will express that this 
cannot be right. 
            Consider the Planck length ℓP, which is the distance light travels in one unit of 
Planck time. If the negation of any social construction claim is clearly true, then this is:  
  
(P)       It is not the case that ℓP is socially constructed. 
  
The boundary between things that are 1 ℓP in length and things that are not is not intuitively 
at all arbitrary or dependent on our social practices: it is the fundamental unit of size in 
physics, and it is definable in terms of other fundamental physical constants (the speed of 
light in a vacuum, the gravitational constant, and the Planck constant). However, we also 
know that 
 
(P=M)  ℓP = 5.72938×10-35meters.  
 
If ‘is socially constructed’ is a predicate of type (e → t ) → t then by basic logic12 it would 
follow that: 
 
12 Again the natural deduction system in Halbach (2009/2010) suffices: in a one-line proof using =-




(M)  It is not the case that 5.72938×10-35 m is socially constructed. 
 
But without question (M) is false. If any social construction claim is clearly true, then this 
is: the ‘meter’ is socially constructed. The difference between things that are n meter in 
length and the things that are not is intuitively arbitrary and highly dependent on our social 
practices. Our social practices pick out a certain Parisian platinum bar that has no 
significance in fundamental physics as the paradigm object that is 1 m long, and they 
define meter as the length of that object. Our social practices could easily have picked out 
another paradigm object, and they could even more easily have made that same paradigm 
just a bit longer or shorter than it actually is. And for the same reason why n meter is 
socially constructed, so is ¼ meter, and 5.72938×10-35 meter13. 
The appropriate conclusion here is not that ‘is socially constructed’ in (P), (P=M), 
and (M) has some type other than (e → t ) → t . Rather, what this argument shows is that 
‘is socially constructed’ behaves like ‘is so called because of his size’--an expression that 
must be paraphrased away before identity elimination or other logical rules can be applied 
to sentences in which it occurs. Let’s consider the analogy in the introduction in detail. ‘is 
so called because of his size’ appears to be a predicate of type e → t.  But it cannot be: if it 
were, then from the fact that Giorgione = Barbarelli and the further fact that 
  
(G)       Giorgione is so called because of his size, 
  
it would follow by basic logic that 
  
(B)       Barbarelli is so called because of his size. 
  
 
13 Recall the importance of distinguishing between counterfactual instability and variation in meaning over 
time or between speakers or communities of speakers. ‘Meter’ is highly stable over time and amongst 
different communities and individual speakers. It has the same meaning in British, Indian, Australian and 
Canadian English. Since the introduction of the term, it has had no other meaning and it may never have any 
other meaning. Nevertheless, at all times since its introduction it could have had various different meanings 
because a Parisian bar that is slightly longer or shorter could have easily been picked to be the paradigm 
object for ‘meter’ at the time of the introduction of the word. 
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And yet (B) is false. It’s starting to get clearer what’s going on. (G) says something about 
the relationship between the name “Giorgione” and the man Giorgione, and what it says 
about it is true. (B) says something about the relationship between the name “Barbarelli” 
and the man Barbarelli, and what it says about it is false. What these sentences say about 
that relationship can be made explicit by paraphrasing them into: 
  
Giorgione is called “Giorgione” because of his size. 
Barbarelli is called “Barbarelli” because of his size. 
  
These paraphrases give rise to no logical anomalies: both  
  




Giorgione is called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size 
  
are true. Similarly, the apparent failure of basic logic involving (P) and (M) is due to the 
fact that (P) says something true about the relationship between ‘ℓP’ and ℓP while (M) says 
something false about ‘5.72938×10-35m’ and 5.72938×10-35m. 
            If the above analogy holds, we should be able to produce logically well-behaved 
paraphrases for social construction claims, just like we are for (G) and (B). The crux of this 
thesis is that we are able to do so. I will do so in two stages. First, will paraphrase ‘F is 
socially constructed’ as: 
             
            The relationship between ‘F’ and F is socially constructed. 
  
Then I will provide an account of what it is for the relationship between a predicate and a 
relation to be socially constructed. 
            So, when ‘F’ is a predicate of any type 𝜎, ‘F  is socially constructed’ is paraphrased 
as a sentence that results from applying a predicate SC of type e→ (𝜎 → t) to “F” (the 
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quote-name of ‘F’, which is of type e) and ‘F’ to form a sentence ‘SC(‘F’,F)’. Thus, the 
examples from section 4 become: 
  
SC(‘heterosexuality’, heterosexuality) (‘SC’ has type e → ((e → t) → t)) 
SC(‘truth’, truth) (‘SC’ has type e → ((t → t)→ t) 
SC(‘=’, =) (‘SC’ has type e → ((e → (e→ t))→ t)) 
SC(‘naturalness’, naturalness) (‘SC’ has type e → (((e → t) → t)→ t) 
  




while (M) becomes: 
  
            ¬SC(‘5.72938×10-35m’, 5.72938×10-35m) 
  
The former can be true and the latter false even when ℓP= 5.72938×10-35m. Furthermore, 






            ¬SC(‘5.72938×10-35m’, ℓP). 
  
            The second stage is a little less straightforward. What is it for the relationship 
between a predicate and a relation to be socially constructed? Before we move on, I would 
like to begin by noting that we cannot have a meaningful disagreement about the correct 
answer to this question. In this thesis, the construction ‘The relationship between ‘F’ and F 
is socially constructed’ means just what I state it means. When I state what it means, we 
can agree or disagree about how good the resulting reconstruction of social construction 
claims are. It should be good insofar as it reconstructs intuitively true social construction 
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claims as truths and intuitively false social construction claims as falsehoods. However, 
what the reconstruction means cannot be disagreed upon because it is something I 
stipulated. 
In section 5, we concluded that the boundaries in the unreflective answer are socially 
arbitrary boundaries and that is what the answer gets right. The way to save the rest of the 
answer is by replacing the talk of things that are soups and non-soups with talk of things 
that are in the extension of ‘soup’ and everything else. The first boundary (which is 
metaphysically arbitrary) is (or is represented by) a function from worlds to sets of 
individuals, which humans had no role in bringing into existence. The second boundary 
(which is socially arbitrary) is created by an association between a predicate and a 
property, which humans had a lot to do with bringing into existence. The best rational 
reconstruction of ‘social construction’ talk, I suggest, is this: soup is ‘socially constructed’ 
in the sense that the association between ‘soup’ (the predicate) and soup (the property) is 
socially constructed.  
One might say that the association between every predicate and property is socially 
constructed in some way. But I mean ‘socially constructed’ here in a highly rarefied sense, 
in which the association between a predicate and a property is socially constructed if and 
only if it is highly unstable under counterfactual variation in our use of the predicate. Let’s 
look at something different from ‘soup’ – ‘gold’. There is a sense in which our social 
practices involving the use of ‘gold’ bring it about that ‘gold’ expresses the property gold. 
But this association is much less dependent on those social practices – and much more 
dependent on our natural environment – than the association between ‘soup’ and soup. 
Recall that the boundary between the extension and anti-extension of ‘soup’ could have 
easily been drawn in a different way. For example, if the culinary authorities jointly agreed 
that ‘All soups are served hot’, then ‘soup’ would have been associated with a different 
property, one that both the gazpacho and the virgin mary would have lacked. On the other 
hand, if scientists arrived at a consensus that ‘gold is a compound’, this would not have 
resulted in an association of ‘gold’ with a different property. It would still be associated 
with gold. What could plausibly account for the difference is that there is a highly eligible 
property, with no close competitors, in the vicinity of our use of ‘gold’, while there are a 
plethora of very similar, highly ineligible properties in the vicinity of our use of ‘soup’, 
where none of them stands out except in virtue of our use of ‘soup’. If we adjust the pattern 
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of use just a bit in the case of ‘soup’, and we easily associate a different property with 
‘soup’. That is what the social construction of the association between ‘soup’ and soup 
amounts to in the rarefied sense.  
A (cautionary) note: according to certain theories of vagueness (such as that 
defended by Williamson 1994), every vague predicate, and hence pretty much every 
predicate, could easily have expressed a different property if our social practices involving 
its use had been different. Keeping that aside, in this thesis the phrase ‘highly unstable 
under counterfactual variations in use’ should be understood as a succinct version of 
‘highly unstable under counterfactual variations in use over and above any instability 
introduced by vagueness’. 
The crux of my rational reconstruction is that F is socially constructed insofar as the 
association between the predicate ‘F’ and the property of being F is socially constructed. 
And being socially constructed has to do with the stability of said association under minor 
counterfactual variations in our social practices involving our use of the predicate. This can 
be unpacked into: 
  
F is socially constructed iff the association between ‘F’ and F is highly sensitive to 
counterfactual variation in our social practises involving our use of the predicate ‘F’.  
  
Or, equivalently (or close enough to equivalently): 
             
F is socially constructed iff it is not the case that if our social practices involving the 
use of ‘F’ would have been slightly different, then ‘F’ would have still picked out the 
same property.  
  
Consider, for example, the following claim: 
  
(P)       Planethood is socially constructed. 
  
According to my reconstruction, (P) is highly plausible. Our use of the predicate ‘planet’ 
changed in 2006 when the International Astronomical Union (IAU) formally defined the 
term. Plausibly, this definition made it so that Pluto was no longer in the extension of 
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‘planet’, not by stripping Pluto of its planethood, but by associating a new property with 
‘planet’. If so, what brought about that association of predicate with property was a minor 
change in our social practices involving the predicate: a group of expert speakers issued a 
declaration, and the rest of us, whether we knew about the declaration or not, continued to 
defer to their usage. And since this in fact happened, then clearly the association between 
‘planet’ and planethood is highly sensitive to counterfactual variation in our use of 
‘planet’, since that association was actually created by a small change in our use of 
‘planet’.  In contrast to that, let’s consider a similar scenario involving ‘gold’, in which the 
gold experts of 1500 AD issue a joint declaration: ‘Gold is not an element’, and the rest of 
us go on to rewrite our natural philosophy textbooks and dictionaries accordingly. (This 
scenario is not very far off from reality: around 1500 AD many if not most of the people 
who were considered as experts on gold thought that gold was a compound.) Supposedly, 
we can say that the experts would have simply been making a mistake, and that the 
rewritten textbooks and dictionaries would have been likewise mistaken and would have 
been corrected with the discovery of the periodic table. Thus ‘Gold is socially constructed’ 



















7. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND SIDERIAN SUBSTANTIVITY 
 
The reconstruction of the social construction claim I have presented is inspired by Ted 
Sider’s (2011: Ch. 4) notion of substantivity. Following Lewis (1983), Sider assumes that 
the correct interpretation of a language is the one that strikes the best balance between 
maximizing fitting use and maximizing naturalness (of semantic values). Roughly 
speaking, fitting use amounts to interpreting speakers of a language in a way that makes 
the sentences they accept to come out as true, except in cases of explicable error. 
Maximizing naturalness amounts to maximizing the naturalness of the properties that are 
semantic values of their predicates. Although the notion of a natural property is extremely 
difficult to make explicit14, it nevertheless seems clear enough to do the kind of significant 
theoretical work it does in Sider’s account of “substantivity”. There are clear paradigms: 
electron is extremely natural, hydrogen still highly but less natural, water is less natural 
still, and philosopher, bachelor, and soup are extremely unnatural. There are cases in 
which the only properties that come close to being good candidates for use-fitting are 
extremely and equally unnatural. In such cases, use-fitting prevails – slight differences in 
our use of a predicate would have resulted in the predicate having another property as its 
semantic value. And in just such cases questions of the form ‘Is x F?’ are not substantive. 
Sider’s idea is that a question is substantive if and only if it could not easily have had a 
different answer (while all the other underlying facts remained the same) owing to some of 
its constituent predicates having different semantic values due to minor differences in use 
in the presence of a multiplicity of equally natural candidate semantic values. Thus, for 
example, ‘Is gazpacho a soup?’ turns out to be a non-substantive question, and ‘Is gold an 
element?’ turns out to be substantive. 
Recall, that soup (according to my reconstruction of social construction) is highly 
socially constructed while gold is very slightly socially constructed. So, the relationship 
between my notion of social construction and Sider’s notion of “substantivity” seems very 
straightforward. The explanation can be something like this - the relationship between ‘F’ 
and F is socially constructed if and only if there is at least one (in Sider’s sense) non-
substantive question of the form ‘Is x an F?’. I won’t get into whether that is always true or 
 
14 See Dorr and Hawthorne 2013 for discussion. 
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not. But even if we were to assume that it is in fact the case that that is always true, we do 
not need to do so for my notion of social construction to work. It is not necessary to accept 
the kind of meta-semantics that Lewis and Sider present in order to accept my notion of 
social construction. It is just a clear fact, I take it, that the relationship between ‘gold’ and 
gold is highly stable under counterfactual variation in the use of ‘gold’ while the 
relationship between ‘soup’ and soup is highly unstable under counterfactual variation in 
the use of ‘soup’. Whether the ultimate explanation of this phenomenon is in terms of the 
extreme naturalness of gold and the extreme unnaturalness of soup is a question I don’t 
need to deal with right now. One advantage of my reconstruction of social construction 
claims over one that makes use of Siderian meta-semantics is that mine does not use any 
controversial theoretical notions--in particular, it makes no use of the notion of naturalness. 
My reconstruction can be spelled out entirely using ordinary counterfactual conditionals 
and standard semantic notions (in particular the notion of a predicate expressing a 
property), and the notion of ‘easy possibility’ (the notion of what could easily have been 
the case). To be fully explicit, my reconstruction replaces ‘F is socially constructed’ with 
‘There is a state of affairs p such that (i) p concerns our social practices involving the use 
of ‘F’, (ii) p could easily have obtained, and (iii) if p had obtained, then ‘F’ would have 
expressed a property different from the one it actually expresses’. 
Note, however, that, even if we make no assumptions about how my notion of social 
construction is related to Sider’s notion of “substantivity”, we will have to conclude that 
my notion, like Sider’s, is gradable (Sider, 2011:Ch. 4). Since stability under 
counterfactual variation in the use of a predicate comes in degrees, so does the social 
construction of the relationship between a predicate and the property it expresses. For 
example, the relationship between ‘planet’ and the property planet is presumably 
somewhat less socially constructed than that between ‘soup’ and the property soup while 
being much less socially constructed than that between ‘gold’ and gold. 
In this connection it is also worth noting why one especially simple reconstruction of 
social construction claims that makes use of the notion of naturalness won’t do: F is 
socially constructed iff the property of being an F is highly unnatural (or falls below some 
specified degree of naturalness). Consider the property of being one nanometre long vs. the 
property of being n Planck units long, where one nanometre = n Planck units. 
Pretheoretically, we want to say that the property of being one nanometre long is socially 
33 
 
constructed while the property of being n Planck units long is not. After all, pre-
theoretically, and in line with the unreflective answer, how long a nanometre is determined 
by how long a meter is, and how long a meter is, is determined by our social practice of 
selecting a platinum bar as the standard meter, whereas we could easily have selected a 
platinum bar of a slightly different length to serve as the standard meter, and in this way 
our social practices serve to draw an arbitrary boundary between the things that are one 
nanometre long and the things that aren’t. In contrast -- again, pre-theoretically speaking 
and in line with the unreflective answer -- how long a Planck unit is, is determined by three 
fundamental physical constants (the speed of light, the Planck constant, and the 
gravitational constant), and thus the boundary between the things that are n Plank units 
long and the rest is not at all an arbitrary boundary drawn by our social practices. It should 
be clear where this pre-theoretical reasoning goes wrong. After all, being one nanometre 
long and being n Planck units long are one and the same property, so, by Leibniz’s law, it 
cannot be that one is socially constructed while the other isn’t. In fact, what this case 
illustrates very clearly is why we have to construe social  construction claims as implicitly 
metalinguistic. There is no difference between being one nanometre long and being n 
Planck units long (they are the same property), but there is a difference between the 
relationships in which ‘is one nanometre long’ and ‘is n Planck units long’ stand to that 
same property. In the former case the relationship is highly sensitive to counterfactual 
variations in our social practices involving the use of the predicate, while in the latter case 
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